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require that on the equitable claim for money had and received
limitations should not commence running until the husband clearly
and unequivocally repudiates his agreement.
ROBERT O. KLEPFER, JR.
Patents-Section 103 Obviousness as a Time-bar Under
Section 102(b)
The Congress shall have Power ....
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the ex-
clusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries .... 1
This is the constitutional basis of the United States patent system.
In 1790 the first patent act was enacted by Congress,2 to be followed
by others, each growing in complexity. For a patent to issue, it was
necessary that an "invention" be useful, new or novel, and an
invention. Typical of these acts was the act of 1870 which provided
that "any person who has invented or discovered any new and use-
ful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement thereof. . . ."' was entitled to a patent.
A great body of decisional law was developed as the courts at-
tempted to define "invention," but as was pointed out by the Supreme
Court,4 "invention" cannot be defined. In recognition of the in-
definableness of invention, affirmative rules were developed to aid
the courts in determining the presence of invention as were negative
rules to indicate the lack thereof.' But these rules did not defini-
tively establish either the presence or lack of invention in fact. In
'U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
2 Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 109.
Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 24, 16 Stat. 201, reenacted, REv. STAT. § 4886
(1875).
'McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 427 (1891).
' Examples of the affirmative rules are the long-felt want for the in-
vention; successful efforts on the part of the inventor over unsuccessful
efforts by those skilled in the art; commercial success of the invention;
imitation by others; new or unexpected results; turning a halt in the art
into progress; and solutions to an outstanding unsolved problem. Some
examples of the negative rules are the mere exercise of skill expected of a
person having ordinary skill in the art; substitution of materials or ele-
ments; reversal of parts; and change in size, shape or form. 2 DELLmR,




1952 Congress enacted the present patent act in which sections 101,"
102,' and 103' set forth a statutory standard of patentability without
requiring "invention." Briefly stated, an "invention" to be patent-
able must be useful, novel, and unobvious to one of ordinary skill
in the art to which the "invention" is addressed. Of these sections,
sections 101 and 102 find their counterparts in the prior acts, but
section 103 is new and there is no corresponding provision in any
of the previous acts. However, it has been stated that section 103
was merely a codification of prior decisional law.9 Furthermore,
635 U.S.C. § 101 (1958).
§ 101. Inventions patentable.
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improve-
ment thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and
requirements of this title.
'35 U.S.C. § 102 (1958).
§ 102. Conditions for patentability; novelty and loss of right to patent.
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or
patented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country,
before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in
this or a foreign country, more than one year prior to the date of the
application for patent in the United States, or
(c) he has abandoned the invention, or
(d) the invention was first patented or caused to be patented by the
applicant or his legal representative or assigns in a foreign country
prior to the date of the application for patent in this country on an
application filed more than twelve months before the filing of the ap-
plication in the United States, or
(e) the invention was described in a patent granted on an application
for patent by another filed in the United States before the invention
thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(f) he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to patented, or
(g) before the applicant's invention thereof the invention was made
in this country by another who had not abandoned, suppressed, or
concealed it ....
8 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1958).
§ 103. Conditions for patentability; non-obvious subject matter.
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically
disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the
prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary
skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall
not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.
'See Stanley Works v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 203 F.2d 846 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 818 (1953); General Motors Corp. v. Estate Stove
Co., 203 F.2d 912 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 822 (1953). It appears,
however, that the statements made in both cases, to the effect that 103 is a
codification, are dicta. But see Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 224
F.2d 530 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 911 (1955) (which is said to
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it was said 10 this about section 103 and the Patent Act of 1952:
With respect to what used to be called the requirement of
"invention"-and the use of the past tense in referring to it
cannot be too strongly urged-the 1952 act did three things:
1. It put the requirement into the statutes for the first time,
in section 103.... Though one may call section 103 "codification"
it took a case law doctrine, expressed in hundreds of different
ways, and put it into statutory language in a single form ap-
proved by Congress. In such form it became law superior to that
which may be derived from any prior court opinion.
2. The Patent Act of 1952 expresses this prerequisite to
patentability without any reference to "invention" as a legal
requirement. Nowhere in the entire act is there any reference
to a requirment [sic] of "invention" and the drafters did this
deliberately in an effort to free the law and lawyers from bondage
to that old and meaningless term....
3. The act sets as the standard of patentability the unobvious-
ness of the invention, at the time it was made, to a person having
ordinary skill in the art. Therefore, what we have today, and
have had since January 1, 1953, is a requirement of unobvious-
ness, rather than a requirement of "invention.""
Therefore, for a patent to issue, an invention must meet the re-
quirements of both sections 102 and 103.Y This, of course, means
that every application presented to the Patent Office for the issuance
of a patent must be examined for compliance with these two sections.
A rejection of an application in the Patent Office, or an invalida-
tion by the courts in an infringement action, based on section 102,
and 102(b) in particular, is generally said to be an anticipatory
rejection, since a "prior art"" reference 14 anticipates the applicant's
have been the first judicial recognition of the restoration of the classical
test found in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850)).
See 55 MICH. L. REv. 985, 993 (1957). See generally Federico, Commentary
on the New Patent Act, 35 U.S.C.A. 1, 14-24 (1954).
10 Giles S. Rich, Associate Judge, United States Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals.
t Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 393, 405
(1960).
" These are not the only requirements the application must meet for a
patent to issue. An application may be rejected, for example, on the grounds
that its claims are broader than the disclosures, that the invention is inoper-
ative, that the invention is not disclosed, that the specifications are not full,
clear, or concise, for double patenting, or because the applicant was not
the first inventor-that is, he could not establish priority in an interference
proceeding.
" See Woodcock, What is Prior Art., 3 VILL. L. REV. 255 (1958)
[hereinafter cited as Woodcock]."4What is a "reference"? It is nothing more than a patent or publica-
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invention. More recently, however, a 102(b) rejection is said to
be a statutory "time-bar" rejection, where the applicant loses his
right to a patent even though the invention is patentable. A rejec-
tion based on section 103 is generally stated in terms of the inven-
tion's being obvious in view of the "prior art" or "unpatentable
over"'15 a particular reference. As can readily be seen, both sections
rely on prior art, but from the statutory language it is not apparent
whether the same prior art used for a section 102(b) rejection may
be used for a rejection under 103.10 It is apparent, though, that
there are time differences from which the prior art may be applicable
or available. For example, section 102(b) provides
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publica-
tion in this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in
this country, more than one year prior to the date of the applica-
tion for patent .... 17
tion cited to show that all or part of the invention for which a patent
is sought was in the prior art, either more than a year before the filing
date to which the applicant is entitled, in which case it is a "statutory
bar" and cannot be sworn back of, or before the applicant's date of
invention. When a reference is not a statutory bar, Rule 131 provides a
procedure by which the applicant is permitted to show, if he can, that his
date of invention was earlier than the date of the reference.
In re Stemple, 241 F.2d 755, 760, 113 U.S.P.Q. 77,-(C.C.P.A. 1957). As
for what constitutes a printed publication, see Cottier v. Stimson, 20 Fed.
906 (D. Ore. 1884):
But something besides printing is required. The statute goes upon
the theory that the work has been made accessible to the public, and is
no longer patentable by any one. Publication means put into general
circulation or on sale, where the work is accessible to the public.
Id. at 910.
" An "unpatentable over" rejection is generally thought to be a § 103
rejection; however, as will be seen later, such an assumption in certain
instances is erroneous. See In re Hughes, 345 F.2d 184, 145 U.S.P.Q. 467
(C.C.P.A. 1965):
That language ["unpatentable over"] usually is taken to denote a sec-
tion 103 rejection. See In re Rice and Wilson, 52 CCPA 998, 341 F.2d
309, 144 USPQ 476; In re Foster, 52 CCPA-, 343 F.2d 980, 145 USPQ
166; In re Dwyer et al., 50 CCPA 1230, 317 F.2d 203, 137 USPQ 904.
Id. at 188 n.2, 145 U.S.P.Q. at 471 n.2 (concurring in part, dissenting in
part); In re Beach & DiRubbio, 245 F.2d 209, 213, 145 U.S.P.Q. 484, 487
(C.C.P.A. 1965) ("This type of rejection continues to cause confusion but
to the extent it indicates a statutory ground of rejection, it is a rejection for
obviousness . . . .") (dissenting opinion).
" Section 102 provides that invention must be "described" in the prior
art reference and section 103 provides that the prior art need not "identically"
disclose or describe the invention.
Emphasis added.
In the determination of novelty, the statute makes time of the essence.
1965]
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This means that a reference A if printed or patented less than one
year before the applicant's filing date will not bar the issuance of a
patent. But, if the reference B was published or patented more
than one year prior to the filing date, it is a statutory bar to the
issuance of the patent. Section 103, on the other hand, provides
A patent may not be obtained ... if the differences between
the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are
such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious
at the time the invention was made .... 18
Therefore, reference A in the prior example could be used to estab-
lish obviousness of the invention if the applicant could not swear
back of the reference under rule 13119 to show a date of invention
It is here that dates become critical in establishing (1) the date of in-
vention, (2) the date of application, (3) the date of the prior knowledge
or use in the United States, (4) the date of public use and sale in this
country, (5) the date of patent or publication describing the invention in
this or a foreign country. From these dates it can be determined whether
or not the time factor has worked a forfeiture of the right to a patent.
The so-called "one-year rule" refers strictly to the date of application
for patent in this country. No length of time is specified for the factors
which affect loss of the right to patent if they occur prior to the date
of invention by applicant. One day is sufficient. The establishment in
this and prior statutes of rigid rules which are so inflexible as to the
time factor, have caused the loss of the right to patent many otherwise
patentable inventions.
1 SMITH, PATENT LAW 285 (1954).
18 Emphasis added.
10 C.F.R. § 1.131 (1960) provides:
Affidavit of prior invention to overcome cited patent or publication.
(a) When any claim of an application is rejected on reference to a
domestic patent which substantially shows or describes but does not
claim the rejected invention, or on reference to a foreign patent or to a
printed publication, and the applicant shall make oath to facts showing
a completion of the invention in this country before the filing date of the
application on which the domestic patent issued, or before the date of
the foreign patent, or before the date of the printed publication, then
the patent or publication cited shall not bar the grant of a patent to the
applicant, unless the date of such patent or printed publication be more
than one year prior to the date on which the application was filed in this
country.
The U.S. PATENT OFFIcE, DEPT. OF COmmERcE, MANUAL OF PATENT Ex-
AMINING PROCEDURE § 715 (3d ed. 1961) provides:
Any printed publication dated prior to an applicant's effective filing
date, or any patent of prior filing date, which is in its disclosure pertinent
to the claimed invention, is available for use by the examiner as a
reference, either basic or auxiliary, in the rejection of the claims of the
application.
Such a rejection may be overcome, in certain instances . . . by ap-
plicant's filing of an affidavit . . . known as "swearing back" of the
reference.
Affidavits under Rule 131 may be used:
[Vol. 44
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prior to both the date of filing and the date of the reference. But
what about reference B?-could it be used as a reference under
section 103, and, if it could, would the applicant be entitled to the
benefit of rule 131 ? If B did not fully describe and disclose the
invention sought to be patented, it does not "anticipate" the in-
vention under 102(b).2O In this situation-that is, where B does
not anticipate-will B provide any statutory ground for rejection?
This question was first definitively answered in the case of In re
Palmquist 1 decided in 1963 by the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals (hereinafter the C.C.P.A.). In that case the applicant's
claims for a protective-reflective film and adhesive were rejected by
the examiner as being "unpatentable over" a combination of various
references. The court with Judge Smith writing construed the re-
jection as being a rejection for obviousness-section 103. During
the prosecution of the application through the Patent Office, the
examiner removed a rejection based on another patent in view of
(1) Where the date of the foreign patent or that of the publication is
less than one year prior to the applicant's effective filing date.
(2) Where the reference, a U.S. Patent, with a patent date less than
one year prior to applicant's effective filing date, shows but does not
claim the invention.
Affidavit ... is not appropriate...
(1) Where reference publication date is more than one year back of
applicant's effective filing date. Such a reference is a "statutory bar."...
It should be kept in mind that it is the rejection that is withdrawn and not
the reference.
See generally THOMAS & AUSLANDER, CHEMICAL INVENTIONS & CHEMICAL
PATENTS § 515 (1964); AMDUR, PATENT OFFICE RULES AND PRAICE §§
131-.12 (1959).
20 No doctrine of the patent law is better established than that a prior
patent or other publication to be an anticipation must bear within its
four corners adequate directions for the practice of the patent invalidated.
Dewey & Almy Chem. Co. v. Mimex Co., 124 F.2d 986, 989 (2d Cir. 1942).
See also Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. Heckethorne Mfg. & Sup. Co., 332
F.2d 406, 414 (6th Cir. 1964); Firestone v. Aluminum Co. of America,
285 F.2d 928, 930 (6th Cir. 1960) ; Southern Phosphate Corp. v. Phosphate
Recovery Corp., 102 F.2d 801 (3d Cir. 1939); Baldwin-Southwark Corp.
v. Tinius Olsen T. Mach. Co., 88 F.2d 910, 914 (3d Cir. 1937); Skelly Oil
Co. v. Universal Oil Prods. Co., 31 F.2d 427, 431 (3d Cir. 1929); Straussler
v. United States, 339 F.2d 670, 143 U.S.P.Q. 443 (Ct. Cl. 1964).
21319 F.2d 547, 138 U.S.P.Q. 234 (C.C.P.A. 1963). This is apparently
the first case to decide the issue here presented; however, prior to the 1952
act the C.C.P.A. decided In re Wenzel, 88 F.2d 501, 503, 33 U.S.P.Q. 30,
32 (C.C.P.A. 1937). The court in Wenzel reached a result contrary to that
in Palmquist on a factual situation which was very similar, but the court
cited no authority for its decision. In support of the conclusion reached in
Wenzel, see the MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 715 quoted
note 19 supra, which has remained unchanged from its first edition in 1949.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the applicant's rule 131 affidavit showing completion of invention
prior to 1952, his application having been filed on June 3, 1954.
However, the examiner would not permit the applicant to swear
back of a printed publication, Van Boskirk's article, because of sec-
tion 102(b) .22 The rejection was affirmed by the Patent Office
Board of Appeals, but was reversed by the C.C.P.A. The court held:
Van Boskirk, however, was published more than one year
prior to appellants' filing date but since it does not "describe"
the claimed invention, it is not a statutory bar under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(b).
The position of the examiner ... is, in effect, that the claims
are properly rejected under . . . § 103 if the claimed invention
was obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the time the
application was filed.23
In the present case we do not have the question of a statutory
time bar which arises under... § 102(b) by reason of the failure
of an applicant to file his application within one year of the date
of the anticipatory publication. The question here is whether
what is obvious to one of ordinary skill in an art is to be de-
termined as of "the time when the invention was made," as speci-
fied in ... § 103, or whether it is to be determined as of some
later date when the application is filed.2 4
The court found that the proper time reference was at the time
the invention was made, and that in the absence of any rules to estab-
lish the time of invention, the rule 131 affidavit was sufficient. The
court, therefore, answered the question in the negative; that is, B
provided no statutory ground for rejection of the patent. Palmquist
permitted the applicant to swear back of the nonanticipating refer-
ence and thereby remove the rejection predicated upon it, even
though the reference was more than one year prior to the date of
application.
However, two years later the Palmquist court had a change of
heart and overruled its decision in it re Foster.;5 Thus, the answer
" The Patent Office was arguing that § 102(b) presented a statutory
time bar situation, but the court did not fully appreciate the examiner's
reliance thereon as the basis of his rejection. This lack of appreciation is
what caused the court to reconsider in In re Foster, 343 F.2d 980, 145
U.S.P.Q. 166 (C.C.P.A. 1965). AmERIcAx PATENT L. A. BULL. 303 (June,
1965). See text accompanying note 25 infra.23319 F.2d at 550, 138 U.S.P.Q. at 137.
-1 Id. at 551, 138 U.S.P.Q. at 138.
" 343 F.2d 980, 145 U.S.P.Q. 166 (C.C.P.A. 1965), petition for cert.
filed, 34 U.S.L. WEEx 3048 (U.S. July 20, 1965) (No. 347).
[Vol. 44
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to whether B provides any statutory grounds for rejection must
be in the affirmative.
In In re Foster the applicant's patent application, Serial No.
605,440, was filed August 21, 1956, for claims addressed to Buta-
diene Polymers and Copolymers Thereof.20 The claims were, for
the sake of convenience, categorically of three types.17 Type I was
characterized by polymers of butadiene-1,3 and copolymers of
butadiene-1,3 and styrene in specific percentages of cis 1,4 structure
and 1,2 structure. Type II was characterized by the same polymers
and copolymers of butadiene-1,3, but in an 85 per cent butadiene
monomer joined in a head-to-tail relationship. And Type III was
represented by claim 28.2s The examiner and the Board of Appeals
rejected all of the claims basing their rejection upon an article29
written by Binder in August, 1954, two years before the applicant
26 trans- Polybutadiene elastomer
Principle component:
Butadiene Rubber BR CH 2 C = CCH~
cis- Polybutadien elastomer Principle component:
Butadiene Rubber BR (CH 2C = CCH1IH H
Butadiene-Styrene Rubber Ore arrangement:
SBR, GRS -CH 2CH = CHCH2 CH 2 C1 -
SOCMA HANDBOOK V at 60 1
(1965). cc
27 Claim 12 is an example of Type I:
A synthetic polymer selected from the group consisting of rubbery
homopolymers of butadiene-1,3 and rubbery copolymers of butadiene-1,3
and styrene; said synthetic polymer being characterized by a cis 1,4-
structure of at least 23% and a 1,2-structure not in excess of 15% of
the polymeric butadiene present in the polymer.
Claim 25 is representative of Type II:
A synthetic polymer selected from the group consisting of rubbery
homopolymers of butadiene-1,3 and rubbery copolymers of butadien-1,3
and styrene; said synthetic polymer being characterized in that at least
85 per cent of the butadiene monomer units thereof are joined in a head-
to-tail relationship.
Claim 28 is representative of Type III:
Products comprising conjugated polyolefin hydrocarbon polymers and
copolymers in which the conjugated polyolefin monomer units are
present in 1,4 addition polymer structure.
343 F.2d at 983, 145 U.S.P.Q. at 169.
8 Ibid.
29 Binder, Microstructures of Polybutadienes and Butadiene-Styrene Co-
polymers, 46 INDUSTRIAL AND ENGINEERING CHEMISTRY 1727 (1954)
[hereinafter cited as Binder].
1965l
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filed his application. The rejection of Type II claims was predicated
upon the conclusion of the Binder article,"0 and applicant's 1,4
structures were found to be "unpatentable over" Binder (the only
reference in issue) without indicating whether or not Binder was
anticipatory.3 The applicant argued on appeal that "unpatentable
over" indicated a rejection based on 103, while a rejection based
on anticipation indicated reliance on section 102(b). The court,
however, rejected this contention, while admitting that the language
used in the rejection was confusing and unclear, stating:
The words "unpatentable over" do not necessarily mean reliance
on section 103 alone. The statements of the rejection are suffi-
cient for us to consider the rejections on both sections 102(b)
and 103.32
The majority then found that Binder did not describe or disclose
the applicant's invention (Type II), at least in the section of the
article relied upon by the examiner, and, hence, did not anticipate
Foster.m
o The results of the analyses reported here show that while the amount
of cis-l,4 addition increases with increasing temperature of polymeriza-
tion, a polybutadiene containing 100% cis-1,4, or trans-1,4 addition
cannot be made at any practical temperature. At least up to 100 ° C. the
amount of trans-l,4 addition in the butadiene part of a butadiene-styrene
copolymer is always greater than in the corresponding polybutadiene,
while the amounts of cis-1,4 and 1,2 additions are less.
Binder 1730.
"l See notes 15 & 20 supra.
32 343 F.2d at 984, 145 U.S.P.Q. at 170.
23 Id. at 984-85, 145 U.S.P.Q. at 170-71. The court found the reasoning
of Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Ladd, 219 F. Supp. 366 (D. D.C. 1963), per-
suasive. In that case the claims were addressed to a 100% cis-1,4-polybuta-
diene, the Patent Office argued there, as it did in this case, that the claims
were anticipated by the conclusion, supra note 30, in the same Binder article.
Claims 17 and 19 of the Smith & Zelinski application, S.N. 578,166, were
addressed to polymers of 1,3 butadiene characterized by at least 85% cis-1,4
addition; this is the same percentage as found in Foster's Type II claims.
In rejecting the Patent Office's argument that the conclusion of Binder
anticipated Smith et al., the court stated:
The Court finds that new and unexpected properties of a truly unique
nature resulted from the presence of at least 85% of the cis 1,4 configura-
tion, and the Court, as well as the Board of Appeals considers the per-
centage to be critical. There can be no doubt as to the nature of that
difference, for prior to Smith et al. no one had described a polybutadiene
having more than 50% of the cis 1,4 configuration. Where criticality is
present, there must be a difference in kind, and the Court finds that
such a distinction exists here.
Id. at 369. It is interesting to note that had the Patent Office not relied
only upon Binder's conclusion, Binder at 1728, Table V, Polymer Nos. 39-1
and 39-3, discloses polymers of 1,4 configuration of 82%. Also, polymers
[Vol. 44
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As in Palmquist, the applicant in Foster had been permitted to
swear back of a patent used by the examiner as a reference and in
so doing had established December 26, 1952, as the date of invention
which antedated the Binder article by nearly two years. The appli-
cant then argued that since his invention date antedated the Binder
article, the reference should be removed on the ground of the hold-
ing in Palmquist. The court rejected the applicant's contention and
thus overruled Palmquist. The court held:
It would seem that the practical operation of the prior law
was that references having effective dates more than a year be-
fore applicant's filing date were always considered to be effective
as references, regardless of the applicant's date of invention, and
that rejections were then predicated thereon for "lack of inven-
tion" without making the distinction which we now seem to see
as implicit in sections 102 and 103, "anticipation" or no novelty
situations under 102 and "obviousness" situations under 103.
But on further reflection, we now feel bound to point out that of
equal importance is the question of loss of right predicated on a
one-year time-bar which, it seems clear to us, has never been
limited to "anticipation" situations, involving only a single ref-
erence, but has included as well "no invention" (now "obvious-
ness") situations. It follows that where the time-bar is involved,
the actual date of invention becomes irrelevant and that it is not
in accordance with either the letter or the principle of the law,
or its past interpretation over a very long period, to permit an
applicant to dispose of a reference having a date more than one
year prior to his filing date by proving his actual date of inven-
tion.s 4
Now, according to Foster, whatever right to a patent an applicant
may have had at the time of his invention, it is lost within the
meaning of section 102 (b) if the invention became obvious to one of
ordinary skill in the art through a publication reference more than
one year before the applicant's filing date. The reference is available
even though it was subsequent to the time when the invention was
containing ca. 85% are found in Tables I and II, page 1727, polymer Nos.
995, 1975, & 1060. Therefore, these claims were, in fact, anticipated, but as
Chief judge Worley pointed out in his concurring opinion, new grounds of
rejection could not be entered into on appeal. 343 F.2d at 992 n.3, 145
U.S.P.Q. at 177 n.3. Thus, in fact, the Binder article anticipated all but
three claims: two claims of Type I were found not to have been anticipated
by the court, as was Type III.
311343 F.2d at 989, 145 U.S.P.Q. at 174.
1965]
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made, but more than one year before the applicant's filing date.8"
This means that reference B in the previous example is now a
statutory "time-bar." Although B does not anticipate the appli-
cant's invention, it became obvious more than one year before
applicant filed his application.
Judge Smith, who wrote for the court in Palmquist, pointed out
in his dissent that he was unable to find a single case where there had
been a loss of right to a patent, except where the invention was
"described" in a prior patent or printed publication 8 5-- an antici-
patory rejection. Judge Smith then found:
Most disturbing of all ... the fact that from this day forward
obviousness under section 103 will be tested, not as of the time
the invention was made, but as of one year prior to the filing
date of the application.
Prior to the enactment of section 103, the determination of
"invention" and the evaluation of the prior art relevant thereto
always was made as of the time the invention was made. To now
change the meaning of section 103 so that obviousness is tested
as of one year prior to the filing date of the application, as it
seems to me is required by the rationale of the majority, I think
we should have some definite indication that such a change was
within the contemplation of Congress in enacting Section 103.
7
An analysis of the rationale of the majority holding will show
a lack of cogent logic which does not render justice, and arguably
denies due process. As pointed out by the majority, references
having effective dates more than a year before the filing date have
been considered to be effective as references regardless of the date
of invention, but these references have been anticipatory."8 For
rejections predicated on prior art before the date of invention as
"lacking invention," it is to be remembered that section 103 not
only provides a substitute requirement-obviousness rather than
invention-but expressly provides that obviousness is to be de-
termined at the time the invention was made. Moreover, section
103 "became law superior to that which may be derived from prior
court opinion. ' 9 Nonetheless, the majority relies upon the "prior
o' See In re Folkers, 344 F.2d 967, 145 U.S.P.Q. 426 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
This case was decided one month after Foster, Smith again dissenting and
cautioning against the denial of procedural due process.
343 F.2d at 994 n.3, 145 U.S.P.Q. at 178 n.3.11 Id. at 999, 145 U.S.P.Q. at 182.
18 See note 36 supra.
"Rich, supra note 11.
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law" to support its conclusion that an invention which became
obvious more than one year prior to the applicant's filing date is
barred by section 102(b). It is virtually impossible to ascertain
what "prior law" the majority had in mind, since the bold proposi-
tions are without authority. Neither did the majority distinguish
the general application of the prior law, which provided that in
order to preclude patentability the description must antedate the
invention or discovery,4° from the "law" which the majority alluded
to as holding otherwise. Furthermore, the "prior law" did not
"speak" in terms of a statutory time-bar; the time provision specified
in section 488641 was a reference from which to determine the
availability of the prior art as an anticipation-that is, lack of
novelty. For the reference to be anticipatory, the elements of the
invention or their equivalents had to be found in a single description
or disclosure.42 If the court was unable to find that the references
were anticipatory, it did not disregard them but considered them
relevant to the question of invention.43 In other words, the courts
have considered lack of novelty and lack of invention as independent
grounds for rejection or invalidation, and this has been true even
after the enactment of the 1952 act.44
The majority also found that the decision in Palmquist was
erroneous in that it periitted the applicant to sleep on his rights more
than a year after the invention became "obvious to the public,
whereby the public has potential possession of it . . . . The
rationale in this latter respect, predicated on "public policy," is
both overbearing and factitious. It assumes in the first instance
that the public has a "vested right" in the applicant's invention.
At most the public has a possibility of possession; it does not have
the invention. If the applicant had filed within one year of the
reference, he then could have excluded the public for seventeen
years from making, using or selling the invention.4" If, on the
other hand, the public had had possession of the invention, then
the applicant would have been barred-because it was anticipated-
40 See Electric Storage Battery Co. v. Shimadzu, 307 U.S. 5, 11 (1939).
,1§ 4886, as amended, ch, 39, § 1, 29 Stat. 692 (1897).
42 1 DE.LER § 72 at 334 & n.1. See also note 20 supra.
"See Himmel v. Serrick, 122 F.2d 740 (7th Cir. 1941).
*' See, e.g., Helene Curtis Indus. v. Sales Affiliates, 233 F.2d 148 (2d
Cir. 1956).
" 343 F.2d at 990, 145 U.S.P.Q. at 175.
"035 U.S.C. § 154 (1958).
19651
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
but only if he had not filed within one year after the anticipatory
reference. Thus, extrapolating the majority's rationale, the con-
gressional fiat of a one-year time limit for anticipatory references
was injurious to the public, since an applicant who falls within the
one-year limit is able to "oust" possession of the invention from
the public and keep it to himself exclusively for seventeen years.
What the majority is concerned with is the situation where the
applicant "sleeps" on his right more than a year and "ousts" a possi-
bility of possession from the public.
The history of the patent acts shows that Congress was con-
cerned with public possession of an invention.17 For one-hundred
and seven years the various patent acts provided that if the invention
was in the public use or on sale before the time of the applicant's fil-
ing, he was not entitled to a patent. 4' However, if the invention was
described in any printed publication, that publication must have ante-
dated the applicant's date of invention in order to preclude him
from a patent. Sixty-seven years ago Congress inserted a time
limitation from which a determination of novelty could be made-
originally two years before the date of application, then one year.
Congress in 1952 specifically provided in section 102 an enumeration
of situations in which an applicant would lose his right to a patent,
4' The Act of 1836, ch. 357, § 7, 5 Stat. 117, provided:
or that it had been patented or described in any printed publication in
this or a foreign country, or had been in public use or on sale with the
applicant's consent ... prior to the application ....
The Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 24, 16 Stat. 198, provided:
not known or used by others in this country, and not patented, or
described in any printed publication in this or any foreign country,
before his invention or discovery thereof, and not in public use or on
sale for more than two years prior to his application ....
Section 24 became section 4886 when reenacted, Rav. STAT. (1875). Section
4886 was amended by the Act of 1897, ch. 391, 29 Stat. 692, to provide:
Any . . . improvements thereof, not known or used by others in this
country, before his invention or discovery thereof, and not patented or
described in any printed publication ... before his invention or discovery
thereof, or more than two years prior to his application, and not in
public use ....
"See Bartholomew v. Sawyer, 2 Fed. Cas. 960 (No. 1070) (C.C.S.D.
N.Y. 1859), which construed § 7, Act of 1836:
The terms, in this section, "prior to the application" for patent, refer
only to the "public use or sale" (of the invention) "with applicant's
consent or allowance." They do not refer to anything else. And the
terms, "prior to the alleged invention or discovery thereof by the





and only in those situations. Moreover, the interpretations of the
patent statutes prior to '1952 expressly held that the courts could
not diminish or deny an applicant any of his statutory rights, 49 and
this was especially true with regard to the various time limitations.
Thus it would appear that the majority has misconstrued the
"prior law" and denied the applicant his statutory rights. It would
also seem that the majority has denied the applicant due process,
since the rejection "unpatentable over" (in its new context of
either a 102(b) or 103 rejection) is vague and does not meet the
notice requirement of section 132. 50
Does the decision in Foster mean that the Patent Office can
combine references which do not anticipate and which are more
than one year prior to the filing date, determine that the applicant's
invention is obvious, and then reject the claims on the ground that
the applicant is barred by section 102(b)? The answer seems to
be a very definitive yes. In the past a rejection on a combination of
Chapman v. Wintroath, 252 U.S. 126 (1920).
There is no suggestion in the record that the original application ...
was not prosecuted strictly as required by the statutes ... and therefore,
it is settled, their rights may not be denied or diminished on the ground
that such delay may have been prejudicial to either public or private
interests.
"A party seeking a right under the patent statutes may avail himself
of all their provisions, and the courts may not deny him the benefit of
a single one. These are questions not of natural but of purely statutory
right. . . . No court can disregard any statutory provisions in respect
to these matters on the ground that in its judgment they are unwise or
prejudicial to the interests of the public." United States v. American
Bell Telephone Co., 167 U.S. 224, 227 ....
Id. at 136-37. (Emphasis added.). " 35 U.S.C. § 132 (1958).
§ 132. Notice of rejection; reexamination.
Whenever, on examination, any claim for a patent is rejected, or any
objection or requirement made, the Commissioner shall notify the ap-
plicant thereof, stating the reasons for such rejection, or objection or
requirement, together wuith such information and references as may be
useful in judging of the propriety of continuing the prosecution of his
application . . . if . . . the applicant persists . . . the application shall
be reexamined .
(Emphasis added.) In this connection, see Rule 132, 37 C.F.R. § 1.132
(1960) (affidavits traversing grounds of rejection).
An applicant whose claims have been twice rejected may appeal the
examiner's decision to the Board of Appeals. 35 U.S.C.-§ 134 (1958). If
the applicant is dissatisfied with the decision of the Board of Appeals, he
may appeal to the C.C.P.A. (thereby waiving a right to a civil action to ob-
tain a patent under 35 U.S.C. § 145 (1958)) within twenty days after he
has filed his notice of appeal as provided in 35 U.S.C. § 142 (1958). 35
U.S.C. § 141 (1958). Unless the applicant has taken a § 141 appeal, he may
appeal the decision of the Board of Appeals in the District Court for the
District of Columbia under § 145.
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references was a rejection for obviousness," and the suggestion
that the references could be combined must have been found within
the references themselves, rather than from the disclosures of the
application.62 If the applicant could show that the "suggesting"
reference had a date later than his date of invention, he could
swear back of it, thereby having the reference removed from con-
sideration and thus causing the remaining combination to fall for
the lack of a "suggestion for the combination" within the remaining
references themselves."3  However, if the suggesting reference is
more than one year prior to the applicant's filing date, it is a statutory
bar. Thus a section 102(b) rejection can be predicated upon a
combination of references regardless of the applicant's date of in-
vention, even though the rejection is only predicated on obviousness.
Judge Smith, on the other hand, tended to exaggerate the ma-
jority's holding, since the court still recognizes the differences in-
herent in sections 102(b) and 103. The court recognizes the in-
herent differences only when the statutory time-bar situation is
not present: that is, where the reference which is not anticipatory
is not more than one year prior to the filing date.5" Of course this
" See It re Andr6, 341 F.2d 304, 144 U.S.P.Q. 497 (C.C.P.A. 1965).
See generally Woodcock 295.
" In re Hortman, 264 F.2d 911, 121 U.S.P.Q. 218 (C.C.P.A. 1959):
In re Shaffer, 229 F.2d 476, 108 U.S.P.Q. 326 (C.C.P.A. 1956); accord,
It re Pavlecka, 318 F.2d 339, 138 U.S.P.Q. 152 (C.C.P.A. 1963); It re
Rothermel & Waddell, 276 F.2d 393, 125 U.S.P.Q. 328 (C.C.P.A. 1960).
" This exact situation is one which very seldom arises and is used here
more or less for illustration.
"Ii re Hughes, 345 F.2d 184, 145 U.S.P.Q. 467 (C.C.P.A. 1965);
In re Yale, Lowinski, & Berstein, 146 U.S.P.Q. 400 (C.C.P.A. 1965); In re
Tanczyn, 146 U.S.P.Q. 298 (C.C.P.A. 1965). All of these cases were de-
cided subsequent to Foster. In It re Hughes supra, Judge Smith, writing
for the court, stated:
We cannot agree with the solicitor that there is no material difference
between sections 102 and 103 with respect to the applicant's right to a
day in court. A rejection under section 102 involves a comparison between
the subject matter disclosed by the reference and the claimed invention,
in order to determine whether the claimed invention is "described" in
the reference.... Section 103, on the other hand, requires consideration
of the differences between the claimed invention and the prior art, for the
purpose of determining whether the claimed subject matter as a whole
would have been "obvious" to one of ordinary skill in the art. Thus, the
issues arising under the two sections may be vastly different, and may
call for the production and introduction of quite different types of evi-
dence.
Id. at 185-86, 145 U.S.P.Q. at 469. The language of Judge Smith is quite
broad and would seem to imply that the court had gone back to its holding
in Palnquist; however, such is not the case as is seen by In re Hassler,
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distinction is of no consequence to the applicant, since, even if the
reference were anticipatory, it would not be applicable against him
because the mandate of 102(b) provides that it must be more than
one year prior to the filing date. Thus only if the applicant's date
of invention is within the one-year period may he escape the rejec-
tion predicated on obviousness. It would seem, however, that the
language of section 103 leaves no doubt that the time of the refer-
ence is to be the invention date rather than the filing date, regardless
of whether or not there is a statutory time-bar present.5
In conclusion it is suggested that section 102(b) has been re-
written by the Foster decision and now provides:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless-
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publi-
cation . . . or became obvious . . . more than one year before
the date of the application...
as has section 103, which now provides:
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the
time the invention was made; Provided, however, that the time
the invention was -mde shall not be more than one year before
the filing date ....
The language of both sections is clearly not as stated above, and
clearly it should not be, but Foster has so construed the sections to
provide what has been suggested. The decision in It re Palmquist
seems inherently correct, giving vitality to all of the statutory
146 U.S.P.Q. 167 (C.C.P.A. 1965). The issue here was what was dis-
closed and whether that disclosure, taken with the prior art, renders the
claimed invention obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art. It was held:
We agree with the board's holding that The News and Observer
article is a valid reference under 35 U.S.C. 102(b) for what is dis-
closed therein, since it is available to the public for more than a year
prior to applicant's filing date. In re Ruscetta .... 255 F.2d 687, 118
USPQ 101; In re Foster supra. The publication is not removed as a
reference merely because it discloses appellant's own invention, or in
early stages of that invention, and the publication, having been available
to the public more than one year, may not be overcome by a showing of
invention prior to the publication date.
Id. at 168-69. judge Smith concurred finding that the article was an"enabling" disclosure under Cohen v. United States Corset Co., 93 U.S.
366, 377 (1876). But "to the extent that the resolution of the issue here
requires a determination of patentability under section 103, as the majority
seems to indicate," he would have reversed. 146 U.S.P.Q. at 175.
" See Woodcock 299.
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language."0 Foster, on the other hand, has rendered section 103 a
mere redundancy.
THOMAS C. WETTACH
Taxation-Gross Estate-Accident Insurance as Life Insurance
For federal estate tax purposes, a decedent's gross estate includes
the proceeds of insurance on the decedent's life, regardless of the
identity of the beneficiary, if the decedent at his death possessed
any of the incidents of ownership in the policy.' In Commissioner
v. Estate of Noel,2 decedent, just prior to a fatal plane crash, ac-
quired two flight insurance policies which were paid for by his wife.
The terms of the policies provided that the beneficiary could be
changed and the policies assigned by written endorsement -of -the
insured. However, having designated his wife as beneficiary, de-
cedent merely handed her the policies. His executor subsequently
excluded the flight insurance proceeds from the gross estate. The
Commissioner determined a deficiency under section 2042(2) and
was sustained in this by the Tax Court.' The Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit reversed,4 distinguishing flight insurance as acci-
dent insurance against a risk rather than insurance against an in-
evitable event which is within the purview of this section.5 Reject-
ing the appellate court's rationale, the Supreme Court held that
0 See United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528 (1955). In a proceeding
on petition for naturalization, the court said:
The Government's contention that § 405 (a) does not apply to any
phase in the processing of naturalization petitions would defeat and
destroy the plain meaning of that section. "The cardinal principle of
statutory construction is to save and not to destroy!'. . . It is our duty
"to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute," Mont-
clair Tp. v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152, rather than to emasculate an
entire section ....
Id. at 538-39. (Emphasis added.)
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 2042 provides in part:
§ 2042. PRocEEDs OF LIFE INSURANcE. The value of the gross estate
shall include the value of all property-
(2) RECEIVABLE BY OTHER B3ENEFICIARIES. To the extent of the amount
receivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies on the
life of the decedent with respect to which the decedent possessed at
death any of the incidents of ownership, exercisable either alone or in
conjunction with any other person....2380 U.S. 678 (1965).
' Estate of Marshall L. Noel, 39 T.C. 466 (1962).
'it re Noel's Estate, 332 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1964).
'Id. at 952.
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